Police may not Detain Motorists after Traffic Stops | Eastern North Carolina Now

    Publisher's note: The author of this post is Michael Lowrey, who is a contributor for the Carolina Journal, John Hood Publisher.

Appeals Court says once an officer has concluded the business that led to the stop, a warrant is needed to keep a motorist any longer

    During a traffic stop, how long after resolving the issue that led to the stop may a law enforcement officer continue to question the motorist? That issue was before the state's second highest court in September, in a case involving a state trooper who issued a warning ticket for speeding and later found more than 7 ounces of cocaine in the car he'd pulled over.

    On Sept. 9, 2014, State Trooper John Lamm stopped a Nissan Altima for a speeding violation on Interstate 95 in Johnston County. David Reed was driving the rented vehicle; his fiancée, Usha Peart, was riding in the front passenger seat. After resolving discrepancies in the rental agreement for the car, Lamm issued Reed a warning ticket.

    Despite telling Reed that he was "completely done with the traffic stop," however, the trooper did not tell Reed he was free to go. Instead, Lamm asked whether drugs, firearms, or illegal cigarettes were in the Altima and if he could search the car. Reed told the officer to ask Peart, who acquiesced to the search.

    Lamm discovered cocaine under the back passenger seat. After Superior Court Judge Gale Adams refused to suppress the results of Lamm's search, Reed pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine in a deal that spared Peart from prosecution. He was sentenced to between 70 and 93 months in prison along with a $100,000 fine.

    On appeal, Reed argued that Lamm's search violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. Reed claimed the trial court incorrectly concluded that the officer had sufficient justification to continue the stop after issuing the warning ticket.

    The Court of Appeals agreed and overturned Reed's conviction.

    "The trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that Trooper Lamm had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to extend the traffic stop and conduct a search after the traffic stop concluded," wrote Judge Robert N. Hunter for the appeals court.

    "The various legal behaviors in the trial court's findings do not amount to a 'reasonable articulable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.'"

    Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court held in the case of Rodriguez v. United States that the Fourth Amendment does not allow police to detain motorists, even briefly, after an officer has completed the tasks associated with the traffic infraction. To detain a driver further requires police to have a "reasonable articulable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot."

    In her ruling, Adams cited several reasons that Lamm might suspect illegal activity: Reed seemed overly nervous; he did not close the patrol car door until ordered to do so; there were discrepancies in the rental agreement; Reed paid cash for the rental; several air fresheners were in the car; a dog and dog food were in the car; and the car showed signs that Reed and Peart may have been living in it.

    The appeals court, however, did not find these reasons particularly convincing, as most were consistent with innocent travel, the majority said. More important, many of the facts Adams cited, such as Reed's nervousness, came to light only after the "tolerable duration" of the speeding stop had expired.

    "To affirm the trial court, as the dissent suggests, is to ignore the United States Supreme Court's direction in Rodriguez," wrote Hunter.

    Judge Chris Dillon disagreed with the majority.

    "Because I agree with the state that Judge Adams' findings support a conclusion that Trooper Lamm obtained defendant's consent to search the rental vehicle after the traffic stop had concluded and defendant was otherwise free to leave, I respectfully dissent," wrote Dillon.

• "Assuming, arguendo, that Trooper Lamm's exchange with defendant following the conclusion of the traffic stop was nonconsensual and that defendant's 'consent' was coerced, I believe that Trooper Lamm had reasonable suspicion of separate, independent criminal activity to support an extension of the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to complete the mission of citing Defendant for the traffic violation."

    In Dillon's view, Lamm finished the traffic stop and then obtained the consent to search "only after his exchange with defendant evolved into a consensual encounter."

    Court of Appeals decisions are binding on the state's trial courts unless overruled by a higher court, such as the N.C. Supreme Court. Because of Dillon's dissent, the state Supreme Court is required to hear the case if the state appeals the decision.

    The case is State v. Reed (16-33).